

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.


GSORTS AND CRS: APPLICATION FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

by


David B. Marquand
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: 

05 February 2001


LTC Jay Simpson
Instructor, NSDM

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

20010510 158

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

2. Security Classification Authority:

3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:

4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.

5. Name of Performing Organization:

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

6. Office Symbol:

C

7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

686 CUSHING ROAD

NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207

8. Title (Include Security Classification):

GSORTS and CRS: Application for the Operational Commander (U)

9. Personal Authors:

David B. Marquand, Lieutenant Commander, USN

10. Type of Report: FINAL

11. Date of Report: 5 February 2001

12. Page Count: 25 | 12A Paper Advisor (if any): LTC Jay Simpson, USA

13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

14. Ten key words that relate to your paper:

Operational Readiness, GSORTS, CRS, MOOTW, JTFC, training, Bosnia, Kosovo, Navy, Army

15. Abstract:

GSORTS and the CRS became the focus of one of the issues in the 2000 Presidential Election. The non-military organizations that used an Army report that two Army divisions were not ready for combat misapplied the system. This misapplication highlighted the serious weakness of the current system of operational readiness reporting. The current system reports strategic readiness in the context of the National Military Strategy. The system does not report true operational readiness. Those that fight at the operational level, the Joint Task Force Commanders, need an operational readiness system. The JCS would eliminate the misuse of the current readiness reporting, strengthen weaknesses within the system, and give the JTFC commander a true operational readiness measure by improving the current system to put reports in context and creating a true operational readiness system.

16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:

Unclassified

Same As Rpt

DTIC Users

X

17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

19. Telephone: 841-6461

20. Office Symbol:

C

Security Classification of This Page Unclassified

INTRODUCTION

In the 2000 United States Presidential Election, military readiness became an issue. One party addressed fears of our military becoming the “hollow force” of the 1970s, while the other side set out to prove them wrong. The argument from then Governor George Bush, at the Republican Convention was that if called on “today” two Army divisions “would have to report – ‘not ready for duty.’”¹ The Republican’s backed their argument with an Army report from November 1999 stating two divisions, the 10th Mountain and 1st Mechanized Infantry, reported a readiness rating of C-4, the lowest possible.² The ensuing debate in the press between the candidates became one of the focal points of the election.³ Some within the military establishment took this as proof that the declining military budget, the fight for resources, and the radically increased operations tempo (OPTEMPO) put our military on the declining trend towards “hollowness”.⁴ This issue brought the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) and the Chairman’s Readiness System (CRS), the systems that produced these ratings, into focus. Critics raised questions of the applicability of this readiness system in understanding its context in fighting “the next war.”⁵ The critics of the system believed this next war to be something in the realm of military operations other than war (MOOTW). Elements of the 10th Mountain and 1st Mechanized were participating in MOOTW operations in the Balkans. Using a rating produced by GSORTS or the CRS out of context, which happened in this case, is not a viable measure of the combat ability or capability of a unit. Not only does the case above show an alarming misunderstanding and misapplication of the system, it highlights its key deficiencies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff designed the system to report a “snapshot in time.” This snapshot reports the readiness of the Armed Forces as a whole to fight in a Major

Theater War (MTW). This snapshot is at the strategic level. The person fighting the next war, a Desert Storm type conflict or a MOOTW, will be the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) at the operational level. While Joint Doctrine recognizes the need for a readiness standard at the JTFC's operational level, neither the Chairman's Readiness System nor GSORTS provide a true operational readiness or capability measure.

In support of the above thesis, this paper will first present a broad overview of both the CRS and GSORTS and how the systems work. It will be based on information from the Joint Publications, not Service instructions. The second portion will analyze the applicability of the CRS and GSORTS, if any, at the operational level. It will present reasoning for an "operational" readiness system. The paper will conclude with recommendations on modifying the current GSORTS system and CRS to place these ratings in context. It will also recommend measures to implement a true "operational" readiness system.

OVERVIEW OF CRS AND GSORTS

Title 10, section 153(a)(3)(c), United States Code, directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to advise the Secretary of Defense on "critical deficiencies" and "strengths in force capabilities" in support of contingency plans.⁶ Sections 153(a)(3)(d) and 193(c) further require the CJCS to establish a uniform system to evaluate the "preparedness of each combatant command" and Combat Support Agency (CSA) to perform assigned missions with "respect to a war or threat of national security."⁷ In order to find some "operational" middle ground, to make sense of "tactical" unit level reporting at a "strategic" level, and to fulfill the requirements of Title 10, the CJCS, in the fall of 1994, established the Chairman's Readiness System.⁸ The CRS requires the war fighting

Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs) to report “operational” readiness as a function of the “ability to integrate and synchronize” forces to perform specific missions.⁹ The CRS requires the Services to report the “tactical” readiness of units. Using these inputs, the CJCS reports to the Secretary of Defense the “strategic” readiness of the Armed Forces to meet the demands of the National Military Strategy (NMS).

At what CJCS Guide 3401A considers the “operational” level, the combatant CINCs, U.S. Special Forces Command (USSOCOM), and CSAs report joint readiness. They deliver quarterly or by direction assessments to the JCS J-3 for preparation of the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR). This review, with inputs from the Services and USSOCOM in a force provider role, becomes a “current and broad assessment of the military’s readiness to fight, across all three levels of war.”¹⁰ The Services and USSOCOM in general report current force commitments, current and projected unit readiness using GSORTS format, an assessment of readiness trends, and force assignments to a notional small-scale contingency (SSC) or Major Theater War (MTW). The CINCs report capability rates, or “C” ratings in eight functional areas on a designated date and projected twelve months into the future. Additionally the CINCs report, in the same functional areas, their capability to support current Operations Plans (OPLAN) and the two MTW scenario. The CINCs may, but do not have to, use a joint mission essential task list (JMETL) or GSORTS to assist in their capability and readiness assessments.¹¹ Both the Services and the CINCs report readiness deficiencies and make risk assessments on the deficiencies in the JMRR. The Joint Staff forwards the JMRR to two bodies, the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC is responsible for the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment

(JWCA), which is an assessment of future requirements to maintain capability and readiness. The JMRR helps identify these requirements. The SROC prepares the final report to the Secretary of Defense on current capabilities, who then approves it as the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRR).¹² The information on the two Army divisions came from this report.

All the assessments in the CRS have their basis in “a common set of definitions and measures” of commander’s readiness assessments at the unit or “tactical” level.¹³ This assessment is produced by GSORTS. GSORTS is the “single, automated reporting system that functions as the central registry of all operational units in the U.S. Armed Forces” providing “a current snapshot of select unit readiness information.”¹⁴ The Department of Defense (DoD) has used a form of readiness reporting since February 1980.¹⁵ Originally called the Unit Report (UNITREP), the system evolved with minor changes to the GSORTS of today using essentially the same reporting format. The designed uses for the system are, in “priority order,” crises response planning, deliberate or peacetime planning, and management responsibilities to organize, train, and equip forces used by combatant commands.¹⁶ GSORTS is designed specifically for two detailed uses. First, the system is the “major source for unit monitoring information and a principal source of the necessary information for operation planning to achieve an adequate and feasible military response to a crisis or time-sensitive situation.”¹⁷ It provides or assists the user with the ability to prepare lists of ready units, estimates of time for units to reach “the situation”, identify or confirm major unit constraints, track location, activity equipment status, and personnel strength to “begin identifying possible shortfalls,” and provide selected data for other automated systems.¹⁸ GSORTS second specific purpose supports the Services and United

States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in organizing, training, and equipping units. SORTS provides the Services and USSOCOM the ability to “focus higher level management attention on problems resistant to normal solutions” and confirm shortfalls and distribution problems in equipment, supplies and personnel for acquisition, reallocation, or redistribution.¹⁹

Most units and all combatants, at some level, report within GSORTS. In the Navy, individual ships, submarines, squadrons, and major staffs report readiness levels. In the Army, all Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) parent and their subordinate organizations report, requiring almost every unit down to battalion and squadron size to be included in the system. In the Marine Corps, battalion and squadron size units and above report in addition to those attached to a Marine Air Ground Task Force or those that are a force level company. In the Air Force, all Regular, Reserve, and National Guard units with a Personnel Accounting System (PAS) code, including detachments along with any unit formed into an organization necessary for a contingency plan, submit a report. In addition to the four major services, the Coast Guard, a variety of CINC and Service registered staffs and units, parts of Combat Support Agencies (CSA), and any higher echelon that has a reporting unit under Operational (OPCON) or Administrative Control (ADCON) are part of the GSORTS system.²⁰

The four categories in GSORTS reports are personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, and training. The system amalgamates these four categories into a final “capability” measurement. In personnel, or “P” level, and equipment, or “S” level, the measurement is a percentage ratio of on hand equipment and personnel to fully manned equipment and personnel. Equipment condition, or “R” level, is a percentage ratio

of mission capable equipment to equipment prescribed. A fully manned and equipped unit, under JCS instruction, fulfills its designed wartime mission. The Services, however, determine these "fully manned" personnel and equipment levels. Therefore, they determine the percentage ratios above. The ratios are assigned in levels from one, the highest, to four, the lowest.

These first three GSORTS categories are easily quantifiable. The fourth, training, or "T" level, is not. By JCS instruction, units report "the present level of training of assigned personnel as compared to the standards for a fully trained unit as defined by Joint and Service directives."²¹ There are three general rules used to guide this measurement. These rules are days needed to fulfill the training required, percentage of operationally ready available aircrew (available only to those units with aircrew), and percentage of mission-essential tasks trained for available personnel. Again, the respective Service determines the training requirements needed for a unit to perform its designed wartime mission. Like the other three categories, a percentage expresses this measure. This percentage equates, like above, to a number from one to four.²²

GSORTS amalgamates the four categories into a unit overall capability, or "C" rating. The "C" rating is determined by the lowest rating of the four categories. For an illustration of the GSORTS rating system see Appendix A. As with the "C" ratings at the CINC's "operational" level, the unit's rating is a snapshot in time. The "C" rating equates to how capable a unit is to perform its designed wartime mission. The designed wartime mission for a unit varies greatly among Services. Services are not required to draw this mission from any central repository of missions or tasks. The wartime mission must,

however, support the National Military Strategy based on the context of supporting a MTW.²³

ANALYSIS

Any analysis of readiness reporting starts with what the DoD measures. As stated above, the DoD measures the ability of our armed forces at the tactical, "operational," and strategic level to conduct a MTW in support of the NMS. The CRS is an excellent mechanism to report the ability of the Armed Forces to support the NMS. The CJCS knows exactly what the readiness of all units is in support of a MTW or a two-MTW scenario. A MTW-supported CINC also knows, at least quarterly, exactly the readiness of the forces assigned to him for his OPLAN. The CINC also can comment on the readiness of the forces assigned to him in support of this strategy and report deficiencies. If he desires, he can break out these deficiencies based on his JMETL or actual GSORTS unit reports.

This system has one major limitation. The CRS does not attempt to create any measurement beyond the capability for the CINC to support the NMS. The CRS states the CINC is reporting at the "operational" level. In reality, because his assessment supports the NMS, emphasizing the capability to fight an MTW, it is at the "strategic" level. The JCS and the CINCs, while using inputs at the unit level, measure overall functions across the strategic spectrum. Functional measures such as Joint Personnel and Theater Mobility fall at the theater-strategic or theater-operational level. The CRS, by instruction, supports the OPLANS required by the NMS that a JTFC, the operational commander, might conduct. Its intent, however, is to provide broad and current assessments for both the Services and, eventually, the United States Congress. The Services use the assessment to

determine where they can improve with respect to their role as a force provider. Congress uses the assessment in determining funding issues and the well being of the Armed Forces. Both of these two functions are "strategic functions". The CRS reports up to Congress, not down to the JTFC. Therefore, the CRS is not an "operational" measurement.

An analysis of GSORTS has the same conclusion as above. GSORTS measures a unit's assets, not capabilities. The system makes an assumption that based on the ratios required by its Service, the unit can fulfill its "MTW" mission. Therefore, the assets measured are in support of an MTW. These very quantifiable ratios, the strength of the system "strategically", are also its weakness at the "operational" level. First, it does not quantifiably measure combat power, support capabilities, sortie generation, or the other major functions of the unit in any contingency but an MTW scenario. A unit might not be "C-1" to complete its wartime mission, but that does not mean it could not complete some level of tasking. An aircraft carrier does not need to report "C-1" to provide electric power if tasked in support of a humanitarian assistance operation. Secondly, the size of the unit, types of equipment, and equipment specialization is not relevant. The unit measures only ratios of equipment and personnel assigned to that actually on hand. A Marine infantry battalion has different personnel and equipment than an Army air assault battalion. These differences might make the "C-2" Army battalion equally as capable of mission success as the "C-1" Marine battalion. Third, all GSORTS measurement categories are weighted equally and have an equal effect on a unit's overall rating. As an illustration, missing a substantial amount of non-mission essential personnel generates the same rating as missing a certain amount of combat ready aircraft. Missing a couple of combat ready aircraft is much more important to mission success than missing a large portion of the unit's

administrative personnel. Fourth, measurements are on a base unit level only. While some units, like an Army Division, take these base units and build a measurement report for the upper echelon unit, others, like a Navy Battle Group or Carrier Air Wing, simply measure the personnel level of their respective staffs. Fifth, GSORTS is a snapshot in time. This final limitation leads to the system being used out of context.

This snapshot, based on the capability of a fully trained unit prior to participating in a MTW, depends on the fourth measurement category of training. Training, by GSORTS definition, has a periodicity. GSORTS assumes a trained unit can only perform at peak capability for a limited time without "retraining." Often a deployed unit accomplishing real world tasking approximating the required training does not receive "credit" within the system. A deployed F/A-18 squadron in support of tasking for JTF-SWA cannot train like it would out of home station. Neither can an armor unit deployed to Bosnia. In both cases, the unit's MOOTW mission might actually improve the ethereal qualities of unit cohesion and morale. The mission might test and validate the unit's capability to operate under increased operational tempo with a "real world" logistics train. The MOOTW mission might even require the unit to do some of the actual "wartime," or MTW, training tasks. But within the systems context of fighting an MTW after deploying from home base, the unit's measured training level still decreases. "Operationally" the unit might be ready and capable, but "strategically" it is not.

Beyond quantifiable numbers and measurements, GSORTS does not account for "human" limitations. First, the Services determine the matrices that make the measurable ratios. The Services are the force provider, responsible for providing a fully trained unit. GSORTS ratings justify training and resources for the Services at a national level.²⁴ A

lower rating can be used to lobby for an increase in resources. In this manner, GSORTS ratings link to the “strategic” Service competition for funding rather than “operational” capability. Secondly, GSORTS reports are very susceptible to what becomes a requirement to report certain readiness levels rather than the actual status. For example, like units generally receive the same amount of training using the same amount of allocated resources at the tactical level. When one commander reports a readiness level, the natural reaction of his peers is to appear at least equally capable. A superior commander, intentionally or not, has a ready-made measure to compare subordinates. Despite being a violation of DoD policy, this “report card” effect can be another measure a superior uses to judge subordinates in their performance evaluation.²⁵ This effect, brought on at the “tactical” level, further exemplifies GSORTS limitations as an “operational” reporting system.

The limitations above help explain why the JCS should reexamine the current system for applicability at the “operational” level. First, Title 10 of the United States Code requires operational readiness measures. Secondly, military leaders recognize force readiness as one of the highest priorities at any level.²⁶ The operational commander, the JTF, is the CINC’s “war” fighter. Operations, especially presently, fall in the arena of MOOTW rather than MTW. As stated in joint publications, the Armed Forces should measure readiness across the spectrum. It should not be confined at the strategic or tactical level. A unit readiness assessment should not be entirely dependent on being within “the system” or not deployed. The current readiness system using both CRS and GSORTS provides a very specialized report usable in generalizing readiness to the Services, the JCS, and, ultimately, Congress, with very little applicability to the operational commander. The

operational commander needs to know if the units assigned are capable of performing their mission. GSORTS and CRS do not do that. The JTFC, the CINC, and the JCS need an operational measure of readiness that bridges the gap between the fixed National Level Strategy and the actual operations of the Armed Forces.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Both CRS and GSORTS are credible systems within their limits. They both quantifiably categorize unit force structure and training into a readiness measure. The CRS does this at a "strategic" level by using the "tactical" GSORTS. They both provide a measure of either a unit or the entire force structure at a specific time in relation to the Armed Forces ability to fight a MTW. The system, however, must be enhanced or expanded to provide a readiness standard at the operational level. First, the JCS needs to reemphasize in the capability overall category, or "C" measure, the reasoning for lower ratings, providing a contextual setting. Secondly, in an era of a shrinking force structure and increasing deployments in support of MOOTW, the JCS needs to create a true operational readiness report based on tasking rather than Service matrices and the capability to fight an MTW. Operational readiness reporting should measure units with regard to current missions assigned, as well as capability to execute a MTW.

The first step the JCS must take is to reemphasize and put in context the reasoning behind a specific level report. While both systems provide a reporting mechanism for this, it does not translate well into the strict categorizations that form the basis for the report. The reasonings are reported "in the margins." In GSORTS the reasoning is in the body of the report or in symbols after the category rating. Those using the system, as illustrated in the case of the two Army divisions, miss the reasoning as they grab for an easily

understood quantifiable rating. In the case of the 10th Mountain and the 1st Mechanized, the Pentagon reported that redeployment to support a MTW was the reason for low ratings.²⁷ Unfortunately, those outside the Pentagon, supplied with the bottom line capability, or “C” overall, ratings, failed to report the reasoning. They used the ratings out of context.

Emphasis must be placed within the current system to explain why units report a certain rating. They should explain the context of the rating. This emphasis should be incorporated into the capability or “C” overall rating in both the CRS and GSORTS. A second letter should be added to the C rating in both systems. This letter should be the generic reason that the unit, in the case of GSORTS, or the CINC, in CRS, cannot report “fully ready” in support of the NMS. It should not be associated, in the case of a deployed unit, with the capability to execute a current “real world” tasking, but strictly in the context of fighting a MTW. This would keep the system’s original intent of readiness in support of the NMS intact while providing a context that could not be easily overlooked.

Both CRS and GSORTS could use six ratings for this context. These added ratings would be lack of personnel (P), lack of equipment (S), lack of supplies and spare parts (R), insufficient resources for training (T), deployed conducting tasking not in support of the NMS in the context of fighting a MTW (D), and expected level of readiness within the current training cycle (E). For example, after a deployment, a squadron stands down. The Navy reduces funding for flight hours, reassigns aircraft and personnel, and allocates training resources, like range and simulator time, to upcoming deploying units. The squadron is expected to report the lowest capability level, or C-4. With the added rating, it

would report C-4E. The 10th Infantry and 1st Mechanized Divisions that had portions of the divisions deployed in support of real world tasking would have reported C-4D.

The benefit of these added ratings is threefold. First, the added ratings would not lessen the ability for the Services to use the system to justify training or assets but rather enhance it. A "P", "S", "R", or "T" rating would illustrate to Congress the need for funding in a particular area. Secondly, this system would help alleviate some of the "human" aspects of the system. With the addition of all ratings, especially the "E", or expected level rating, a commander would find it much harder to use the GSORTS "report card" effect on his reporting subordinates. Finally, the added rating letter would emphasize the actual use of the current systems. The letter rating would explain why the unit is outside the bounds of the system. The systems would continue to effectively report "strategically" on the capability of the armed forces as a whole to fight one or two MTWs in support of the NMS. With the "strategic" level reporting fixed, JCS should design an "operational" level readiness reporting system independent of MTW capabilities.

This operational readiness reporting system would be fundamentally different than the one based on the NMS. First, the system would properly gauge the status of Armed Forces to participate in missions other than a MTW. It would measure units involved in a MOOTW. Secondly, the operational readiness report would only apply to units involved in actual tasking. Third, this measure of operational readiness, or operational capability level, would equate to common functions that a JTF staff uses in planning. Fourth, this capability level would be quantifiable in measurable terms. The operational readiness report must quantifiably determine a unit's capability against its measure of effectiveness

for a given task. Overall, the system must emphasize readiness as a function of current tasking rather than in training for a MTW.

The JCS would require operational readiness reports only on deployed units assigned to real world tasking by a higher headquarters of JTF equivalence. For example, a report would be generated on those units assigned to JTF-SWA or to Bosnia or Kosovo. Secondly, JCS should assign the commander in charge of the real world tasking, usually the JTF commander, to provide a benchmark capability. This benchmark must be common with standard JTF planning. Defining a benchmark should start with the identification of essential tasks, just like in a JTF planning process. Joint doctrine provides a common list of tasks in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). The JTFC would identify tasks from the UJTL at the appropriate operational (OP) level. Each task has an associated measure of effectiveness (MOE). Each MOE is a ready-made benchmark for each task. Each is quantifiable in some way. The JTFC and his staff would use those measures that best apply to his tasking. Further, each measure, to apply the familiar "C" rating, must be categorized by some percentage of capability to achieve complete mission success. This measure of success should be standard for every MOE. Ninety percent success would equal a "C-1" rating, eighty percent a "C-2" rating, seventy percent a "C-3", and everything below a "C-4".

Each of these tasks and related benchmarks or MOEs would become the responsibility of the highest echelon unit assigned to the tasking or function. For example, air tasking would fall to the JFACC while intelligence tasking would functionally fall to the J2. This "component" would base the "C" rating on the forces assigned, their capabilities based on GSORTS ratings, the MOE desired, and his or her own functional

expertise. The JTFC would then amalgamate these ratings from each component and determine a "C" overall rating for his assigned forces to accomplish his tasked mission. Appendix B illustrates an example of this system.

These recommendations have three strengths. First, the recommendations use the current readiness system. GSORTS effectively reports a quantifiable output of readiness by amalgamating four distinct quantifiable inputs at the tactical level. CRS uses GSORTS as a basic building block to narrowly define readiness as a function of supporting the NMS at the strategic level. By placing reasoning within the "C" overall measurement up front, no user can use the rating without the contextual situation that determined the rating. The contextual situation, where a unit is in a training cycle or assignment of real world tasking, is now as important as the rating itself. The contextual situation does not detract from the original intent of the system, which is a measurement of capability to support the NMS.

Second, the operational reporting system reinforces Joint Doctrine and answers the "so what" of operational readiness reporting. By linking functions directly to the UJTL and using its measures, the operational system provides the CINC a direct measure of force structure and capabilities to his actual tasking. Recommendations in the JMRR now have a second quantifiable measurement based on joint functions rather than just Service guidelines. By highlighting these operational functions, the Services now have tangible guidelines to create measures of effectiveness for their training in support of joint training and real world tasking. The operational system can help establish a commonality among all services in relation to these tasks. Finally, by placing readiness reporting in the context of JTF or real world tasking, the operational system would not be influenced by the two major "human" factors. By placing responsibility for reporting at the component level

within the context of the current mission, a commander cannot use the comparison report card effect in measuring subordinates. By relating measurements to tasks and functions at a joint operational level, when used as funding justification, the emphasis goes from supporting a single service to supporting joint operations.

Finally, the suggested operational reporting system is not hard to do and dovetails with current operational planning. When forming a JMETL, a planning staff already draws out what tasks it considers important from the UJTL. From the tasks on the JMETL, they determine which standards are used to gauge operations. The component commanders already have a responsibility to gauge their efforts on these MOEs. By placing the reporting responsibility on the components or functional experts, the operational system requires no detailed computer model or complex matrix. These experts should already know if they have the forces and systems to accomplish the tasks at the desired level of success. Just as employing their assigned forces, these "C" ratings for the functional expert should be intuitive. Added to the two strengths above, this strength further bolsters the recommendation for an operational reporting system.

CONCLUSION

Admiral Prueher wrote in 1999 "measuring readiness is easier said than done".²⁸ He recognized readiness depends on benchmarks. He acknowledged the subjective qualities of any readiness system. He documented the lack of a system to link tactical readiness to operational and strategic levels. Finally, he stated that there was no "simple equation" for "aggregating" readiness data from one level to the next. CRS and GSORTS attempt to convey military readiness at the strategic and tactical level. These systems base readiness on capabilities tied to the National Military Strategy, not to actual mission

accomplishment. In doing this, the reports lose the context of current operations. Consequently, these systems do not translate well to the task oriented JTFC at the operational level. Another system must be put into place to compliment GSORTS and CRS. This system must tie readiness and capability together. It should measure capability as a function of accomplishing tasks. The tasks must be common in nature and translate to dissimilar units. A measure or benchmark must be in place to measure the capability of the unit to accomplish these tasks. It must disassociate itself from the weaknesses in the current systems. The recommended additions to the overall system above would provide the framework at the operational level.

Quantifiable measurement systems will never at any level be perfect in measuring something as intangible as readiness. As Admiral James Loy, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, states, "if a small set of numbers exists that can convey an accurate sense of overall military readiness, it has so far eluded the most determined efforts to find it."²⁹ Readiness is not wholly quantifiable in many areas, especially when dealing with the human aspects of morale, individual determination, and innovativeness.³⁰ This does not abrogate the responsibility of the military to report the readiness of the force. The JCS must, within the best contextual settings, provide some measure for both those who pay the bill, the American people, and those who fight the battles, the operational commander. The JCS can fulfill both mandates by improving the existing measurements and creating a true operational measurement system.

APPENDIX A

The JCS establishes in each reporting category a percentage equating to a rating.

Table 1 illustrates these ratings by percentage for the equipment, or "S," category. The Navy determines that (x) number of aircraft fulfill the primary wartime mission of an F/A-18 squadron. A squadron has (y) number of aircraft, or 90% of the required number.

Using Table 1, its "S" rating would be S-1.

TABLE 1.

RULE	Resource Area Status Level 1/			
	S-1	S-2	S-3	S-4
1. Combat-Essential Equipment. Total available Service-selected combat-essential equipment divided by prescribed wartime requirement	>=90%	>=80%	>=65%	<65%
Total available aircraft divided by prescribed wartime requirement (if applicable)	>=90%	>=80%	>=60%	<60%
2. Support Equipment. Total available Service-selected support equipment divided by prescribed wartime requirement	>=90%	>=80%	>=65%	<65%

After measuring the other three categories as prescribed by the Navy, the squadron determines its ratings as P-1, R-2, and T-1. JCS instruction states that the overall capability rating, or "C" level, must equate to the lowest of the four sub-categories.

Therefore, the squadron reports an overall rating of C-2. According to CJCS Instruction 3401.02B CH-1, C-2 in textual terms means:

The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake most of the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed. The resource and training area status may cause isolated decreases in flexibility in methods for mission accomplishment, but will not increase vulnerability of the unit under most envisioned operational scenarios. The unit would require little, if any, compensation for deficiencies.³¹

APPENDIX B

The below example is a rough sketch of how the operational readiness reporting system would work. Numbers are added for illustrative reasons only. The reasoning and strengths of the system are contained in the body of the paper.

A CINC has established a JTF to support peacekeeping operations (PKO). As part of the PKO, a higher authority establishes an Air Exclusion Zone to keep potentially unfriendly neighbors from interfering with ground operations. In order to do this the JTFC, in his planning process, determines key tasks from the UJTL. The tasks assigned to the Joint Forces Air Component Commander are OP 1.5.3 "Gain And Maintain Air Superiority In The Joint Operations Area (JOA)," OP 3.1.5 "Publish Air Tasking Orders (ATO)," and OP 3.2.5.1 "Conduct Air Interdiction Of Operational Forces/Targets," as required. The JTFC also decides on which measures of effectiveness will determine mission success for the above tasking. Using OP 1.5.3 as an example, the CJTF determines that to achieve absolute mission success, 100 percent of friendly forces must operate under an air superiority umbrella (M6) and the force must 100 percent of the time have air superiority over operational area (M7).³² With the assigned units, the JFACC determines, based on a combination of the forces assigned, their capabilities based on GSORTS ratings, the measures of effectiveness desired, and functional expertise, that he can accomplish M6 with an 90% success rate, or a C-1 rating. He determines because of insufficient numbers of aircraft assigned that M7 can be achieved successfully only 80% of the time, or C-2. These measurements would be amalgamated with all other tasks to produce an overall C rating. The JTFC would report this rating along with the reasons for non-C-1 ratings to the CINC.

¹ Philip Dine, "Pentagon, "Bush Differ on Readiness of Military; Defense Experts Say His Warning is Off Base; Bush's Aides Defend His Stand," St Louis Post-Dispatch, 11 August 2000, A1.

² John Hillen, "Armed and Unready: Why are We Pouring Money Into a Military Designed to Fight Wars of the Past," The San Francisco Chronicle, 15 October 2000, sec. 1, Z1.

³ Steven Lee Myers, "The 2000 Campaign: The Military Issue; What War-Ready Means, in the Pentagon Accounting," The New York Times, 4 September 2000, sec. A, p. 15, col. 1.

⁴ Hillen.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System, CJCS Guide 3401A (Washington, DC: 31 July 1997), 9.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid, 10.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman's Readiness System, CJCSI 3401.01B CH-1 (Washington, DC: 19 June 2000), D-7.

¹² JCS, CJCS Guide 3401A, 9.

¹³ Ibid, I-1.

¹⁴ Ibid, 5.

¹⁵ Lawrence J. Kolb and Melvin R. Laird, The Problem of Military Readiness (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, 1980), 17.

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS), CJCSM 3150.02 (Washington, DC: 15 April 2000), A-1.

¹⁷ Ibid, A-8.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid, A-8 – A-9.

²⁰ Ibid, B-8 – B-10.

²¹ JCS, CJCSI 3401.02 Ch-1, C-6.

²² JCS, CJCSM 3150.02, N -18 - N-20; Kolb and Laird, 19.

²³ For further detailed instruction and GSORTS matrices, refer to appropriate Joint and Service manuals.

²⁴ Matthew S. Goldberg, Gregory G. Hildebrant, Suzanne M. Holroyd, S. Craig Moore, and J. A. Stockfisch, Measuring Military Readiness and Sustainability (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1991), 15; General Michael P. C. Carns, USAF (ret.) quoted in Penny J. Dieryck, Wesley W. Long, Thomas G. Philipkosky, Ronald Reis, and David M. Snyder, Joint Readiness Assessment and Planning Integrated Decision System (JRAPIDS): Combat Readiness and Joint Force Management for 2025 (1996), 2.

²⁵ Goldberg, Hildebrant, Holroyd, Moore, and Stockfisch, 16.

²⁶ D. L. Grange, BG, USA (ret.), "Readiness is a Moral Responsibility," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 4 (April 2000): 2.

²⁷ Dine.

²⁸ Joseph W. Prueher, Admiral, USN, "Measuring Readiness: Aggregating Readiness Data from the Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Levels is Difficult", Armed Forces International 136, no 6 (January 1999), 16.

²⁹ James M. Loy, Admiral, USCG, "Readiness is More Than Numbers," United States Institute Proceedings 126, no 2 (February 2000), 42.

³⁰ Victor J. Croizat, Col., USMC (ret.), "Readiness: Also a State of Mind," Marine Corps Gazette 81, no. 8, (August 1997): 68-72.

³¹ JCS, CJCSI 3401.02 CH-1, C-1.

³² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Universal Joint Task List, CJCSM 3500.04B CH-1 (Washington, D.C.: 01 November 1999), 2-294 – 2-435.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adler, Amy B and Carl A. Castro. "OPSTEMPO (Operations Tempo): Effects on Soldier and Unit Readiness." Parameters. 29, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 86-85.
- Beck, Richard R. "Training Tomorrow's Navy: The Impact of Joint Vision 2010 on Training Naval Forces." Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1997.
- Betts, Richard. Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC: 1995.
- Briscoe, William F. "Trained and Ready-Are We Really?" Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1999.
- Buchanan, William B. and Dean D. DeWolfe. "Linking JMETLS to the JMRR for Readiness Assessment." Unpublished Brief, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA: 1996.
- Carrier Air Wing Seven. "Training and Readiness Review." Unpublished Brief, NAS Lemoore, CA: 2000.
- Collins, John M. Military Preparedness: Principles Compared with U.S. Practices. Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington, DC: 1994.
- Conetta, Carl and Charles Knight. The Readiness Crisis of the U.S. Air Force: A Review and Diagnosis. Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, MA: 1999.
- Croizat, Victor J. "Readiness: Also a State of Mind." Marine Corps Gazette. 81, no. 8 (August 1997): 68-72.
- Deitchman, Seymour J. Quantifying the Military Value of Training for System and Force Acquisition Decisions: An Appreciation for the State of the Art. Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA: 1993.
- Dieryck, P. J., W. Long, T. Philipkosky, R. Reis, D. Snyder. "Joint Readiness Assessment and Planning Integrated Decision Systems (JRAPIDS): Combat Readiness and Force Management for 2025." Unpublished Research Paper presented to Air Force 2025 Committee, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, AL: 1996.
- Dwyer, J. "Deployment Readiness is Truly Commander's Business." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1997.

- Forster, Scott T. "Army: Full Spectrum Relevance and Readiness." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2000.
- Goldberg, Matthew S., Gregory G. Hildebrant, Suzanne M. Holroyd, S. Craig Moore, and J. A. Stockfisch. Measuring Military Readiness and Sustainability. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA: 1991.
- Grange, David L. "Ready for What? Why the Army's System for Reporting Unit Readiness Doesn't Shed Much Light on Who's Ready for What." Armed Forces Journal International. 137, no. 5 (December 1999): 42.
- _____. "Readiness is a Moral Responsibility." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 126, no. 4 (April 2000): 2.
- Hairston, James. "OPTEMPO to OPRED: Building an Accurate Measurement Tool to Determine Readiness." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1998.
- Hatley, Jerry D. "The Effects Operations Other Than War Has Had on the Readiness of the United States Army." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1996.
- Karle, A. J. "Operations Across the Spectrum of Conflict: What Suffers?" Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1995.
- Kochman, Steven. "America's Silver Bullets: Allocating Low Density High Demand Assets." Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1999.
- Korb, Lawrence J. and Melvin R. Laird. The Problem of Military Readiness. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, DC: 1980.
- Leed, Maren, David Persselin, and Jennifer Morrison Taw. Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA: 1998.
- Loy, James M. "Readiness is More Than Numbers." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. 126, no. 2 (February 2000): 42-45.
- Mayfield, Maurice J. "Measurement of Combat Effectiveness During Peacetime Preparation for War." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1992.
- Moore, S. Craig. Measuring Military Readiness and Sustainability. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA: 1991.

- Nizolak, Joseph P. "Peace Operations and Their Impact on Combat Readiness." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1999.
- Prueher, Joseph W. "Measuring Readiness: Aggregating Readiness Data from the Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Levels is Difficult." Armed Forces Journal International. 136, no. 6 (January 1999): 16.
- Rash, Charles R. "Joint Readiness Evaluated." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1995.
- Riley, Michael N. "Untrained and Unavailable: The Impact of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) on Forces Destined to Support the Combat CINCs." Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI: 2000.
- Sommer, John T. "Peace Operations: Readiness and Relevance." Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1997.
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on National Security. Military Readiness 1997: Rhetoric and Reality. 9 April 1997.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCS Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System. CJCS Guide 3401A. Washington, DC: 31 July 1997.
- _____. Chairman's Readiness System. CJCSI 3401.01B CH-1. Washington, DC: 19 June 2000.
- _____. Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS). CJCSM 3150.02. Washington, DC: 15 April 2000.
- _____. Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS), CJCSI 3401.02 CH-1. Washington, DC: 19 March 1999.
- _____. Universal Joint Task List. CJCSM 3500.04B CH-1. Washington, D.C.: 01 November 1999.
- VanGuilder, Jonathan D. "Does MOOTW Degrade Combat Readiness." Unpublished Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI: 2000.
- Wyland, Stewart W. "The National Security Strategy and Peacetime Engagement Operations: Can We Afford to Keep Our Heads in the Sand?" Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1996.